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Online Book Reviews
Mismatch: How Affirmative Action Hurts Students It’s Intended to
Help, and Why Universities
Won’t Admit It
By Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor
Jr.
Basic Books, New York, NY, 2012. 348 pages, $28.99.

Reviewed by Michael Ariens
Mismatch is one of the most important
books about law and public policy published
recently. The authors, Richard H. Sander, a
professor at UCLA School of Law, and Stuart
Taylor Jr., a journalist with a law degree,
offer a provocative and deeply researched
conclusion: Empirical evidence strongly suggests that affirmative action in the admission
of African-Americans and Hispanics to selective colleges and law schools is more harmful
than helpful.
Mismatch has three major themes. The
first concerns the results of Sander’s empirical work on the efficacy of racial preferences
in admission to institutions of higher learning. Some highly selective colleges and law
schools give minority applicants, particularly
African-American and Hispanic students,
large admissions preferences based on their
race or ethnicity. These preferences create
what Sander and others call a “cascade”
effect. The most elite schools get their
pick of the most academically qualified students, including minority students (some of
whom need no admissions preference). This
requires second-tier schools to use significant preferences to build a representative
class, and so on down the line through the
eight tiers into which colleges are divided.
The process works similarly in law school
admissions. Sander and Taylor assert that,
“[f]or many black and Hispanic students, ...
the preference has proved to be a curse.”
The second theme of Mismatch is that
academics and the media tend to avoid
candid discussions of the costs and benefits
of racial preferences in admission to higher
education institutions. Sander and Taylor
investigate why affirmative action based on
race and ethnicity remains so combustible
a public policy issue. Closely related to the
unwillingness of academics and the media to

discuss the instrumental value of affirmative
action is the refusal of those who possess
data that could provide evidence of mismatch (or evidence disproving mismatch) to
share such data with empiricists who could
analyze it objectively (and who might reach
undesired conclusions). This stonewalling
is both breathtaking and saddening. The
authors offer several examples of efforts to
limit the ability of Sander and others to evaluate (and thus, possibly, to find wanting)
the effects of affirmative action based on
race and ethnicity. For example, the Mellon
Foundation “refused as a matter of policy to
make the College and Beyond data available
to other scholars to replicate and check” the
conclusions supporting affirmative action
made in the book The Shape of the River by
William Bowen and Derek Bok, former presidents of Princeton and Harvard Universities.
The unprofessional treatment of Sander by
both the American Bar Foundation and the
Law School Admission Council—treatment
that was apparently due to the mismatch
article that led to this book, and treatment
that impinged on Sander’s academic freedom—is shocking. Finally, at the time of the
publication of Mismatch, Sander’s request
for data compiled by the California State Bar
to test the mismatch thesis remained hostage in the California Supreme Court, where
it remains at the time of this writing nearly
a year later.
The third major theme of Mismatch is
that “most universities’ ... single-minded
focus on racial identity” results in a “pervasive neglect of poor, working- and even
middle-class students.” Sander and Taylor
make a persuasive argument that classbased affirmative action can be successfully
undertaken and should replace affirmative
action based on race and ethnicity.
In the late 1990s, half the black UCLA
School of Law students graduated in the
bottom 10 percent of the class, and half
the Hispanic students graduated in the bottom 20 percent of the class. Both black
and Hispanic UCLA graduates passed the
California bar at a rate much lower than did
their white classmates. Additionally, black
and Hispanic UCLA School of Law graduates
passed the California bar at a lower rate than
did graduates of less elite law schools who

had similar LSAT scores and undergraduate
grade point averages (which the authors call
“academic indices”). Why? One explanation
for this disparity was that the bar was racially biased. But the authors show that empirical research found no racial bias on the bar
exam. The authors suggest that the reason
for this disparity was “mismatch.” Many
though not all black and Hispanic law students were given relatively large admissions
preferences based on race and ethnicity, so
they were admitted to more elite law schools
than were white students with similar academic indices. As a consequence, the black
and Hispanic students tended to have lower
academic indices than their classmates, and
students with lower academic indices often
graduated at or near the bottom of the class.
Because the strongest predictor of bar exam
passage was how well one performed in law
school (no matter how elite the law school),
this mismatch of students and law schools,
created by affirmative action, “was roughly
doubling the rate at which blacks failed bar
exams.”
One reason mismatch produced such
a large negative effect on law school performance (and thus lesser success on the
bar examination) was the way law professors teach. Most professors teach to the
broad middle of the class. The farther a
person’s academic index is from the median
of the student body, the more difficult it
becomes to master the material. To describe
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this effect, Sander used two hypothetical
students, one black and one white, with
the same academic index in college. The
black student, he hypothesized, attended
Columbia Law School, while the white students attended Fordham University School
of Law, a very good law school but not
as elite as Columbia. If the black student
found himself in the bottom tenth of the
graduating class at Columbia, and the white
student graduated in the middle of the class
at Fordham, the former was “three times
as likely to fail the New York bar as his
white Fordham counterpart.” The reason
was that the Columbia graduate’s grades
demonstrated “not only that he learned less
than his Columbia classmates, but less than
his counterpart at Fordham.”
As of the early 2000s, “about 47 percent
[of black law students who enrolled in law
school] were becoming lawyers,” whereas
“83 percent of entering white students were
becoming lawyers.” At that time, admissions
preferences increased the overall pool of
black law students by 14 percent, but less
than a third of that 14 percent became
lawyers. If the 86 percent of black students who would have been admitted to law
school without affirmative action passed the
bar exam at the rate their white academic
counterparts did, then, with the addition of
the fraction of the 14 percent who became
lawyers, the overall result would be an
increase in the number of black lawyers.
But Sander found that mismatch “appeared
to reduce the other 86 percent’s chances
of becoming lawyers by nearly a third.”
Sander concludes: “Admittedly, these were
estimates; nonetheless, the negative effect
on the success of black law students was
clearly much larger than the positive effect
of racial preferences in expanding the pool
of blacks admitted into law schools.” Even a
critic of Sander’s thesis acknowledged that,
if law school admissions preferences were
removed, the number of black law students
who would become lawyers by passing a bar
exam would remain steady.
This counterintuitive notion, that at least
the same number of black law students will
be licensed as lawyers without race-based
admissions preferences as with such preferences, is based in large part on the theory
that “[s]tudents who have much lower academic preparation than their classmates will
not only learn less than those around them,
but less than they would have learned in an
environment where the academic index gap
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was smaller or did not exist.” This sobering
assessment suggests that some black and
Hispanic students have been admitted to law
school to make law school faculty and administrators (and their university counterparts)
feel better about themselves, even as they
consign those students to a reduced chance
of becoming lawyers. Sander also found that
affirmative action did not lead to increased
overall earnings for minority students based
on the credentialing effect of graduating
from a more elite law school. Instead, such
students will too often carry a large debt
for student loans and relatively little means
to pay off those loans. Given the wrenching
reduction in opportunities for legal employment, the affirmative action mismatch problem requires an open discussion of the instrumental value of affirmative action.
Mismatch’s second theme—suppressing
discussion of the actual costs and benefits of race- and ethnicity-based affirmative action—is distressing precisely because
critics of Sander’s work too often chose
not to rebut it with other careful empirical
work, but to make it hard for Sander to see
if his mismatch research was replicable. As
Sander makes clear in the preface, he views
himself as a progressive, as one interested
in the economic and professional advancement of those who have suffered from discrimination. His opposition to race-based
affirmative action is wholly instrumental, not
ideological. Affirmative action isn’t working,
and so must be changed. He and Taylor
provide a variety of examples of institutional
suppression of empirical work that might
question the value of affirmative action.
These examples describe a pattern that
goes well beyond good faith disagreements
about protecting the privacy interests of
those individuals studied. A fair conclusion is
that these examples constitute institutional
malfeasance.
The problem of under-representation
of African-Americans and Hispanics in the
American legal profession is a continuing
problem. But the work of Richard Sander
strongly indicates that placing all our hopes
in the power of affirmative action has generated deleterious effects for those this “solution” was designed to aid. Sander and Taylor
suggest, echoing the work of others before
them, that the proper turn should be to
preferences based on class rather than race.
They also suggest that this turn is not as difficult to implement as feared by those who
continue to defend race-based affirmative

action. Discussing the issue of race is fraught
with problems, but American lawyers and
American society would do well to face this
issue directly. 
Michael Ariens is a professor of law at St.
Mary’s University in San Antonio, Texas,
where he teaches American legal history,
constitutional law, evidence, and other
courses. He is the author of Lone Star
Law: A Legal History of Texas (2011) and
other books.
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Reviewed by JoAnn Baca
This first novel by lawyer Susan Rieger
is a charming account of a divorce. If that
sounds improbable, it is because you have
not yet cracked the covers of this unusual
and engaging novel. It is not only a terrific
story, but the protagonist, Sophie Diehl, is
as three-dimensional as a character on paper
can be.
The Divorce Papers has no narrator,
but is told through e-mails, memoranda, letters, draft agreements, and other documents
pertaining to Diehl’s first divorce case and
to her personal life during the case. Diehl is
an almost-30-year-old associate in the prestigious firm of Traynor, Hand, Wyzanski in
New Salem, a fictitious city in the fictitious
state of Narragansett. She has specialized in
criminal defense work during her year and a
half with the firm. She likes criminal law and
is good at it, having settled in comfortably
at the firm and gained a mentor with whom
she has an easy camaraderie. When Maria
Durkheim, the daughter of a major client,
comes to the firm to find a lawyer to handle
her divorce, none of the firm’s divorce specialists is immediately available, and Diehl
reluctantly steps in to do the intake interview. Diehl advises the client to have one of
the divorce specialists handle her case, but,
unfortunately—in Diehl’s view as well as that
of some of the partners—the client ignores
Diehl’s advice and insists that Diehl represent her. Diehl tries to convince the partners
that her “rank inexperience as a lawyer
who’s never done a civil case, let alone a
divorce,” should preclude her from handling
the case. She adds, “I am ill equipped tem-

